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The Low-Income Tenant in California:
A Study in Frustration
By DANIEL N. LOEB*
A substantial part of California's low-income population lives in
substandard housing.1 Despite the requirements of the State Housing
Law2 and the administrative regulations and local housing codes adopted
pursuant to that act, the low-income tenant is often powerless to compel
his landlord to comply with these codes, even when the landlord is fi-
nancially capable of compliance.
There are a number of reasons for this impotence. A major factor
is one of supply. California, along with the rest of the country, suffers
from a severe shortage of adequate housing.3 The low-income tenant,
with less dollars to spend for available housing, has his choice of housing
severely limited. If he is black he has the additional problem of dis-
crimination. Finally, if the tenant is on welfare and has children, prob-
lems of family size and landlord attitudes drastically restrict the avail-
able housing. This scarcity of supply, combined with the landlord's
absolute power of termination, often forces the tenant to remain in
premises unfit for habitation.
Unfortunately, even the legal system exerts coercive influence on
the low-income tenant seeking relief from substandard housing con-
ditions. Substantively, the law of landlord-tenant remains largely feu-
dal in nature. Ancient notions of property are often applied without
regard to their viability. This may be explained historically as a re-
flection of economic and political power, judicial attitudes, and inade-
quate legal representdtion for indigent tenants. These substantive limi-
tations are reinforced by the procedural stranglehold of the unlaw-
ful detainer action. The tenant's opportunities for defensive or affirm-
ative action are severely restricted by the confines of this statutory pro-
cedure together with its restrictive judicial overlays.
* A.B., 1958, Bowdoin College; J.D., 1961, Harvard University; Member,
California Bar.
1. See, e.g., OAKLAND PLANNING DEP'T, OAKLAND'S HOUSINo SUPPLY (1968).
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17910-95.
3. PREsIDENTs COMMrrEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT Hoi.m (1969).
[2871
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The net result of the above factors, and others dealt with herein, is
that the tenant, for the most part, is powerless to compel his landlord
to do what is theoretically required by state law. A major concern of
this article is the social significance of the dichotomy between the pro-
visions of housing codes and the realities of enforcement. As will be
seen, this dichotomy affects the low-income tenant's attitudes toward
the legal system and the prospects of achieving change through tra-
ditional channels. In the following pages, I shall review the remedies
available to the tenant under existing law in an effort to show their
ineffectiveness. In so doing, I hope to paint the anomalous picture of
the legal system's efficient support of the landlord who violates the law
and its abandonment of the tenant whom the law was meant to protect.
After analyzing the existing possibilities, several appropriate changes
will be recommended. It is not my intention to delve deeply into either
the existing law or my proposed changes; rather, I hope to describe
broadly the situation as it exists and to suggest the general contours for
the needed changes.
I. Problems of a Hypothetical Low-Income Tenant
In order to picture the position of a low-income tenant and to
illustrate in a minor way his frustration and alienation, it may be useful,
in law school fashion, to assume a hypothetical situation.
Mrs. A is the mother of three young children. She is black and
lives in one of the larger Northern California cities. The neighborhood
has a large majority of black residents and housing that is old and often
substantially below code standards. Portions of this area are in the
throes of redevelopment. The difficulties of finding housing in a city
with a depressingly tight supply are thus magnified by the reduction of
available units pursuant to urban renewal demolition. In addition, com-
petition is substantially increased by the need to relocate the families
living within the condemned properties and by the priority given these
families by the government agencies charged with the duty of relocation.
Mrs. A is separated from her husband. Her sole income comes
from a salary that she is paid under a work-training program and from
payments made by the County Department of Social Welfare under the
Aid for Dependent Children's program. Her total income is $3 904 per
month and she pays $150 per month for the two bedroom apartment
which she and her children occupy.
4. This includes approximately $221 in AFDC payments and $169 from the
work-training program, which is composed of a $25 basic allowance, $9 for transpor-
tation expenses, and $135 for child care.
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The A family moved into their present apartment some seven
months ago. Shortly after moving in, Mrs. A was informed by a repre-
sentative of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company that the gas heaters
in the apartment were leaking and that it was necessary to disconnect
them until they were either repaired or replaced. She further discovered
that certain of the electrical fixtures did not work and that there was no
electrical service outlet in her bedroom. In the larger bedroom, where
her children sleep, there was a large hole in one of the windows, which
the rental agent promised to repair. Finally, Mrs. A discovered that
the apartment was infested with roaches, and she has, on occasion, seen
rats.
Mrs. A has complained to the rental agent several times. He
always states that the heating, electrical fixtures and windows will be
repaired, but no action is ever taken. He advises her to buy poison for
the roaches and rats, which she has done numerous times-an expense
she can little afford. This has not had any substantial effect since the
entire building appears to be infested. Although the roaches tempo-
rarily diminish after the application of roach killer, they quickly return.
When cold weather came, Mrs. A tried to heat the apartment
with the kitchen stove; nevertheless, most of the apartment remained
chilly and drafty. Her children had a succession of colds and other
illnesses which forced Mrs. A to take time off from work to care for
them. Eventually, she also succumbed to a respiratory infection that
laid her up for two weeks, causing her to be dropped from the work-
training program.
The shortcomings of Mrs. A's apartment could be magnified, both
in the number and in the seriousness of the code violations involved;
yet a realistic picture of low-income housing would still be presented.
The purpose of this article, however, is not to paint the appalling
picture of the condition of much of our low-income (often ghetto) hous-
ing, nor to discuss the serious social consequences that flow from such
housing.5 Rather, the focus will be on the nature and adequacy of the
remedies open to the low-income tenant in California and the frustrating
experience of the tenant who seeks to compel a landlord's compliance
with the requirements of the law.
5. For a discussion of the social consequences of inadequate housing see, e.g.,
K. CLARK, DARK GnETro (1965); M. HARRiNGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: PovETrT ix
THE UNr D STATES (1962); A. ScHoRa, SLUMS AND SocLAL INsEcuarry (U.S. Dep't of
Health, Educ. & Welf. Research Report No. 1, 1963).
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II. Tenant Remedies and Their Effectiveness
In analyzing tenant remedies, we shall first examine California's
"repair and deduct remedy." Next, we shall turn briefly to adminis-
trative code enforcement. Following this, consideration will be given
to the possibilities of rent withholding. In so doing, it will be neces-
sary to examine the operation of the California unlawful detainer action
and delineate some of the evolving tenant defenses.
A. Right to Repair and Deduct the Cost of Repairs
At common law, a landlord had no duty to repair in the absence
of an express covenant.' The lease was viewed as a sale of an interest
in land. Accordingly, under the rule of caveat emptor the landlord
was under no obligation to put the premises in suitable condition prior
to the lease nor to maintain them thereafter.7 The only obligation of
maintenance was that of the tenant to prevent waste of the property."
The common law rule has been modified in California by sections
1941 and 1942 of the Civil Code. Section 1941 obligates a lessor,
in the absence of a contrary agreement, to put a building intended for
human occupation into a condition fit for such occupation and to re-
pair all subsequent "dilapidations" that render it untenantable.' Sec-
tion 1942 permits a tenant, after reasonable notice to the lessor, either
to repair the "dilapidations" that the lessor ought to repair (where the
cost of the repairs does not exceed one month's rent), or to vacate the
premises without further obligation for rent. 10
Unfortunately, our hypothetical tenant would find there are many
inherent dangers in the use of this remedy. First, she has probably
signed an agreement waiving any rights under sections 1941 and 1942.
6. Brewster v. DeFremery, 33 Cal. 341 (1867); Wall Estate Co. v. Standard
Box Co., 20 Cal. App. 311, 128 P. 1020 (1912); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78,
at 346 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
7. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
8. Brett v. Berger, 4 Cal. App. 12, 87 P. 222 (1906).
9. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1941 provides: "The lessor of a building intended for the
occupation of human beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it
into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof,
which render it untenantable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen hundred
and twenty-nine."
10. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1942 provides: "If within a reasonable time after notice to
the lessor, of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may
repair the same himself, where the cost of such repairs do not require an expenditure
greater than one month's rent of the premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs
from the rent, or the lessee may vacate the premises, in which case he shall be dis-
charged from further payment of rent, or performance of other conditions."
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Although leases are infrequent in the rental of slum property, rental
agreements are not; a standard provision in such agreements is a waiver
of all rights under these sections.
There are, indeed, a number of arguments questioning the validity
of such a waiver. Given the necessity of housing, the limited supply
for low-income tenants, and the resultant limitation of any meaningful
choice or bargaining power, the elements are present for the treatment
of the rental agreement as a contract of adhesion." If the repair rights
of the tenant pursuant to section 1942 are construed to be limited by the
obligation of the lessor under section 1941,12 the limitation of the lessor's
duty by "agreement' may likewise be analyzed by adhesion prin-
ciples to show that there is in actuality no agreement. In the alter-
native, section 1942 could be construed not only to be independent of
section 1941, but also to include the requirements of the State Housing
Law and local housing codes within the guidelines defining what the
landlord "ought" to repair. If so construed, such a waiver could then
be considered an agreement indirectly seeking to exempt the lessor
from responsibility for a violation of law. This would be contrary to
Civil Code section 1668."4 In any event, courts construe such waivers
narrowly; moreover, under the standard language, the waiver applies
solely to the leased premises. Thus, our hypothetical tenant's vermin
problems resulting from infestation of the building can be construed to
be outside the purview of such a waiver.' 5 Nevertheless, whether or
not a judge in the justice or municipal court will strike a standard
provision of this sort is unclear. Because of this indefiniteness, the
tenant who makes appropriate repairs in the building and deducts the
cost from his rent faces the possibility of a speedy eviction for non-
payment of rent. 16 In most cases the tenant, because he can find no
11. For a general discussion of the theory of contracts of adhesion under Cal-
ifornia law, see Comment, Contracts of Adhesion under California Law, 1 U.S.F.L.
REv. 306, 317 (1967). See also Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Pub-
lice Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1247 (1967).
12. That is to say if the reference in section 1942 to "dilapidations which he
ought to repair" is defined in terms of the obligation set out in CAL. CiV. CODE § 1941.
13. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1941 is effective only "in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary."
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 provides: "All contracts which have for their object,
directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful
injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negli-
ent, are against the policy of the law."
15. Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct.
App. Dep't 1967).
16. Note, Retaliatory Eviction-Is California Lagging Behind?, 18 HAsnTiNs L.J
700 (1967).
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other available housing, desperately needs to remain in possession of the
premises and is unwilling to run the risk of eviction no matter what.
Even if the tenant has not waived his rights, section 1942 pro-
vides limited relief and raises many unanswered questions. The sec-
tion sets a limit of one month's rent for the cost of repairs. How often
can this be done? Is it limited to one month's rent for the length of
the tenancy? If so, the extent of the work necessary in most slum
properties makes this section virtually useless. If a tenant does the
work himself in order to limit the expense and maximize the number of
repairs, can he allow a reasonable amount of his labor? What is meant
by "dilapidations"? Does roach and rat infestation constitute a dilapi-
dation? What is encompassed within the confire of "repairs"? One
case has drawn a distinction between "repairs" and "improvements."17
Does the addition of an electrical service outlet required by a local hous-
ing or building code constitute an improvement?18 Must the repairs
actually be made before the rent can be withheld, or can the tenant
accumulate the rent first and then apply it to repairs? The ambiguity of
the language of section 1942 and the paucity of cases construing it
again place the tenant in the difficult position of speculating on what is
permitted. An incorrect guess will result, of course, in the tenant either
paying for the repairs himself or being evicted for nonpayment of rent.
Were the dangers and problems of section 1942 not sufficient to
deter the tenant, the possibility of retaliation by the landlord for the
tenant's use of section 1942 would provide the finishing touches. The
tenant who resorts to section 1942 or contacts the agency charged
with enforcement of housing codes is viewed as a "trouble maker."
Landlords usually counter such tenant efforts with a 30 day notice to
vacate, or alternatively, a notice that the rent has been raised sub-
stantially, which compels the tenant to move as a matter of economics.
The defensive postures toward lessor retaliation are discussed later
in connection with code enforcement. " Although certain constitu-
tional arguments against retaliation may not be relevant to section 1942,
a court could nevertheless conclude that landlord retaliation for the
tenant's exercise of his right to repair pursuant to section 1942 is against
public policy2" and against the policy implicit in the remedial provisions
17. Wall Estate Co. v. Standard Box Co., 20 Cal. App. 311, 315, 128 P. 1020,
1021 (1912).
18. Under the rationale of the Wall Estate Co. case it would seem to be an "im-
provement" rather than a "repair" and therefore not permitted.
19. See text accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
20. See text accompanying notes 49-54 infra.
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of sections 1941 and 1942. Once again, however, our tenant is placed
in the doubtful and dangerous position of conjecturing what the re-
sponse of a given court will be.
In conclusion, it is clear that sections 1941 and 1942 provide
doubtful relief for our hypothetical tenant. Although on occasion
these sections might be useful for minor repairs, the limitations and
ambiguities of this remedy, combined with the problems of waiver and
retaliation, render it virtually useless.
B. Code Enforcement
The traditional law of landlord-tenant has been further modified
by the State Housing Law,2 by the administrative regulations adopted
pursuant to that act,22 and by the various local government codes re-
lating to residential housing. 3 Enactments of this kind have as their
purpose the preservation of healthful and safe conditions in housing,
and the rehabilitation of deteriorated premises. 24  Unfortunately, one
look at the large amounts of substandard housing within the state25
demonstrates that code enforcement has had only limited success.
2 6
Many enforcement problems flow from the nature of the agencies
charged with the enforcement of the various housing laws. Generally,
they are understaffed in both inspectors and clerical personnel;2 1 further-
more, enforcement responsibility is often divided between various agen-
cies, each having responsibility for enforcement of the different codes or
limited areas of specialization.' The result of this division is ineffi-
21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17910-95.
22. CAL. ADmIN. CODE tit. 8, §§ 17000-926.
23. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BUILDING OFFICIALS, UNiFORM
HOUSING CODE (1964) and INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BUILDING OFFICIALS,
UNFORM BUILDING CODE (1964), with which all local codes in California are re-
quired to be reasonably consistent. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17922, 17951.
24. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, 78 HARv. L. REV.]. This Note encompasses an
excellent analysis of code enforcement and numerous references will be made to it.
25. See note 1, supra.
26. See, e.g., F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS (National
Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 14, 1968); Gribetz & Grad, Housing
Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1966); Com-
ment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 304 (1965); Note, 78 HARv. L. REv., supra note 24, at 801.
27. Comment, supra note 26; Note, 78 HARv. L. REv. supra note 24, at 804. The
Superintendent of Inspection in San Francisco states that he needs four additional
environmental health inspectors to add to the present 12 and at least two additional
people in the complaint division to supplement the present five. Interview with Alfred
Goldberg, Superintendent of Building Inspection for San Francisco, in San Francisco,
May 6, 1969.
28. Note, 78 HARv. L. REv., supra note 24, at 809.
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ciency, added strain on already limited resources, confusion for the
tenant seeking to enforce the code, and areas of enforcement for which
the existing agencies each disclaim responsibility.29
Problems also arise from the nature of the remedies used by the
agencies. Code enforcement is provided with two principal weapons:
(1) criminal sanctions in the form of fines or jail sentences;30 and (2)
abatement"1 through the eviction of all the tenants and, possibly, demo-
lition of the building. Neither of these remedies are usually successful
against a recalcitrant landlord. Moreover, criminal sanctions have not
been sympathetically received by the courts.32  Jail sentences are vir-
tually never imposed;33 fines, when imposed, are often minimal and
may be treated by the landlord simply as a cost of doing business.
34
Abatement orders, in turn, can have disastrous consequences for the ten-
ants; what is more, their large scale use can intensify the already critical
shortage of housing.
The shortcomings of these remedies are magnified by the long
periods of delay involved in the imposition of any penalty. 35 Numerous
29. Id.
30. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17995, provides: "Any person who violates
any of the provisions of this part or any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant thereto
is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars
($500) or by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment." See also INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BUILDING OFFICIALS, UNI-
FORM HOUSING CODE § H -204 (1964).
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17982; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
BUILDING OFFICIALS, UNIFORM HOUSING CODE § H-202 (1964).
32. As a result, in San Francisco the District Attorney's office refuses to file
criminal prosecutions for housing violations. Interview with Alfred Goldberg, supra
note 27.
Judicial attitudes toward criminal penalties have been explained in one article as
follows: "The failure of the criminal sanction in code enforcement is largely due to
its conceptual and logical inappropriateness. . . . Criminal courts are unwilling to
recognize housing violations as true 'crimes,' and, in the traditional sense, this is not
an indefensible attitude. However inexact the age-old distinction may be in the crimi-
nal law between malum in se-the true crime, the 'wrong in and of itself' like murder,
assault, robbery, or larceny-and malum prohibitum-a wrong . . . which does not
necessarily bespeak inherent moral delinquency-it is clear that the unintentional failure
to . . . replace a broken window pane in the hallway of a multiple dwelling falls into the
latter category ...
. . . It is not surprising that judges in criminal courts, who generally regard intent
as a necessary element of crime, are reluctant to impose criminal sanctions on a de-
fendant who may have become a criminal without knowledge, or by inadvertent negli-
gence." Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1254, 1279 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
33. Note, 78 HARV. L. REV., supra note 24, at 824.
34. See Gribetz & Grad, supra note 32, at 1277.
35. In San Francisco some owners in the past have been able to string out corn-
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hearings at different levels within the agency are required to gain the
owner's compliance.3 0  Failure to secure compliance at the adminis-
trative level necessitates a reliance on the city attorney or county coun-
sel to bring suit. These offices, in turn, are frequently short of man-
power and the unglamorous code enforcement work may assume a low
priority for the attorney assigned.3T Finally, the court may grant nu-
merous continuances to the owner in an effort to achieve compliance.
Thus, an owner can often string out the enforcement process for years.38
Although the code enforcement agency may have the power to re-
pair, the power is infrequently used because of limited funds and
problems of administration. San Francisco has recently enacted a code
section providing for repairs by the city.39 Any expenses incurred are
advanced from a revolving fund.40  These costs, plus a 15 percent fee,
become an assessment lien on the property upon action by the Board of
Supervisors. 41  The success of such a program, however, is question-
able because it is doubtful that any significant amount of money will be
appropriated for the revolving fund. Similar programs elsewhere have
made it clear that recovery of funds may not be successful and that the
city may have to be prepared to subsidize the repairs at substantial
cost.42 Furthermore, without an increase in the size of the code en-
forcement agency, it is hard to see how a substantial number of projects
could be undertaken.
What then can our hypothetical tenant expect from the code en-
forcement agency? She may find total confusion and frustration
when she attempts to locate the appropriate agency among those shar-
ing the responsibility for residential property; she might even be faced
with a disclaimer of responsibility by all agencies. The agency respon-
pliance proceedings for as long as 8 to 10 years. Interview with Alfred Goldberg,
supra note 27.
36. For instance, in San Francisco informal hearings are held at two levels, first
before the Division Head of the Multifamily Dwelling Division and then before the
Superintendent of Building Inspection. If unsuccessfully dealt with, the matter is then
referred to the department's complaint division for a formal hearing before the Di-
rector of Public Works. SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., BUILDING CODE § 203.B-.D (1969).
After the decision of the Director, the owner is entitled to appeal to the Abatement
Appeal Board. Id. § 203.1. Only then, in the absence of an emergency situation,
would the matter be referred to the City Attorney to file suit in court. Interview with
Alfred Goldberg, supra note 27.
37. Note, 78 HARV. L. REv., supra note 24, at 816.
38. See note 35 supra.
39. SAN FRANCISCO, CAmLF., BUILDING CODE § 203.M (1969).
40. Id. § 203.K-.L.
41. Id. § 203.P-.R.
42. For a description of the New York experience, see Grad, supra note 26, at 62.
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sible for the particular violation may also exclude the hypothetical
tenant's housing from those assigned priority for inspection. This may
result in a complete refusal to inspect.4" Even if the agency inspects,
notes the violations, and directs repairs to be made, the landlord may
disobey such orders without penalty, thereby extending agency action
for months and years. Furthermore, if the procedure terminates in a
trial, the landlord pays only a miniscule fine for the violations. Finally,
the tenant may find herself faced with the disastrous prospect of being
ordered to move by the agency, which, after inspecting the premises,
may find violations well beyond the tenant's limited complaints, re-
sulting in abatement proceedings which force ber to vacate.44
In all likelihood, however, the tenant will not have to wait an ex-
tended period before being forced to move from the leased premises.
As with an attempt by the tenant to use Civil Code section 1942, the
predictable response of the landlord in this situation will be an attempt
to rid himself of a "troublemaker." On the day that the landlord is
contacted by the building inspector, or the tenant voices her intention
to contact the department of public works, the landlord will serve the
tenant with a 30 day notice to vacate or a notice of substantial rent in-
crease. If the tenant protests this retaliatory eviction, a predictable
judicial response would be a reference to the unlimited power of the
landlord to terminate a periodic tenancy 5 and the discomforting obser-
vation that "if the tenant doesn't like it, then why doesn't she move?"
There is a trend toward limiting the landlord's power to retaliate
against a tenant. Some states have passed specific prohibitions against
retaliation; 6 several courts have refused to sustain the landlord's action
on several bases. At the constitutional level, two possible grounds
have been proposed. The first rests upon the view that action by the
court would be a violation of the citizen's right of petition and redress.
47
The second relies on the constitutional right of a citizen to inform the
government of a violation of the law and to be protected by the govern-
43. An example of the bureaucratic morass that confronts the tenant can be
found in Comment, supra note 26, at 317 n.67.
44. SAN FRANcisco, CALIF., BUILDING CODE § 202.D (1969).
45. Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 885, 279 P.2d 215,
216 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1955).
46. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 170-92.1 (Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-20-10 (Spec. Supp. 1968).
47. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 696-98 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1969). The Law and Motion Judge in the trial court relied on this theory
in setting aside a default judgment. Habib v. Edwards, 34 U.S.L.W. 2242 (D.C. Ct.
Gen. Sess., Oct. 29, 1965).
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ment for so doing.
48
The leading case of Edwards v. Habib,49 however, relies instead
on public policy and the inherent purpose of the housing and sanitary
codes. The court held that given the concern of Congress to secure
decent and sanitary housing for slum dwellers and the importance of
tenant complaints in reporting violations, to permit retaliatory evictions
clearly frustrates the purposes of the legislative action.50 The court
concluded by stating:
The notion that the effectiveness of remedial legislation will be in-
hibited if those reporting violations of it can legally be intimated
is so fundamental that a presumption against the legality of such
intimidation can be inferred as inherent in the legislation even if
it is not expressed in the statute itself.51
The status of retaliatory eviction in California is unclear. The
case of Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson5 clearly enables the ten-
ant to question on constitutional grounds the propriety of the court prac-
tice of assisting the landlord in retaliating against the tenant. The
statutory construction and public policy arguments in Edwards v. Habib
would seem to apply equally well to the State Housing Law53 and local
housing codes. 4 Nonetheless, the tenant is again in an area of con-
jecture. The tenant's taking advantage of a remedy requiring the land-
lord to perform duties imposed by law necessitates a dependence on a
favorable judicial construction of the housing laws; yet, the courts have
been notably unsympathetic and blind to any change, based on social
considerations, in the application of these laws. Once again, the price
for the tenant's actions may well be speedy eviction.
From the above discussion, it is clear that administrative code
enforcement does not provide meaningful relief for the low-income ten-
ant. The administrative limitations, the inadequacy of the remedies,
and the danger of eviction through abatement or retaliation make it
impossible for our hypothetical tenant to turn to a code enforcement
agency with any assurance of success.
48. Tarver v. G & C Constr. Corp. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1964) (unreported) (cited
in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 690-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
49. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
50. Id. at 700-01.
51. Id. at 701-02.
52. 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962).
53. CAr.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17910-95.
54. California courts, in the analogous situation of employment at will, have af-
forded relief where the employer's reasons for termination were against public policy.
Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1961); Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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C. Rent Withholding
Suppose, in frustration, the tenant simply stops paying the rent.
She realizes that the landlord is not going to make the promised re-
pairs or comply with the applicable housing regulations. She decides,
therefore, that he is not entitled to rent. What response can she ex-
pect from the landlord and the courts?
1. The Immediate Dangers-The Landlord's Lien and the Noose of the
Unlawful Detainer Procedure
The first action that might be expected from the landlord is some
form of self-help, either authorized or unauthorized by law. If the
tenant lives in a furnished apartment house, the landlord could avail
himself of the Draconian remedy provided by Civil Code section 1861.
In accordance with recent amendments, this section gives the landlord
a limited right to enter the rented premises without liability for con-
version, trespass, or forcible entry. He may take everything lawfully
within the tenant's possession, except prosthetic or orthopedic appli-
ances, or a musical instrument used by a tenant to earn his living.55
The landlord can remove and retain, for example, the clothing, food,
and medicine of our hypothetical family. If the amount demanded
by the landlord is not paid within 60 days, he is authorized by law to
sell these items at public auction.
Even if the tenant lives in an unfurnished apartment building, the
landlord has a similar right of entry." Although the exemptions pro-
vided are more extensive, they are still limited and do not include the
family's food, medicine, and clothing (unless it is necessary for the
tenant's work).
Indeed, the tenant may come home one day to find that the land-
lord not only has removed all of her property but also has changed the
lock on the door, thereby, in effect, evicting her without complying with
any of the legal requirements. If she sought aid from the police for the
landlord's unlawful action, she would most likely be advised that it is a
"civil matter" and that she should see a lawyer. If she should be
fortunate enough to secure legal representation, she may still find her-
self and her family without shelter for several days.
Suppose the landlord follows the unlawful detainer procedure
rather than resorting to self-help.58 In contrast to the delays of code
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1861(1)-(2).
56. Id. § 1861a.
57. Id. § 1861a(a)-(d).
58. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1161-79a.
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enforcement, the statutory framework of the unlawful detainer action
combined with judicial attitudes unsympathetic to the tenant will often
result in the precipitous removal of the tenant from possession. This
action is instituted by the service of a three day notice to either pay rent
or quit.59 Shortly thereafter, the tenant would be served with a summons
and complaint in unlawful detainer. This special summons gives the
tenant only three days to file a pleading. 0 It has been observed that,
whether by design or chance, a large percentage of complaints in unlaw-
ful detainer are served on Friday nights or Saturdays. Frequently, the
unsophisticated tenant will not realize the extent of the peril facing her
and consequently will allow a few days to pass before seeking help.
Furthermore, a tenant aware of the importance of filing a responsive
pleading on time may simply be unable to meet the deadline. If the
tenant is served with process on Friday night, she has, in essence, one
day in which to answer. This means that within one day she must
take care of her other obligations and arrange to see an attorney (assum-
ing any representation is available). In that same day the attorney
must secure filing fees, and prepare and file the answer. Obviously,
in a fair percentage of the cases, a default judgment will have already
been entered before the client is able to make use of whatever legal
assistance may be available. The tenant can only hope that the court
will use its judicial discretion to stay execution under the jtudgment and
set aside the default.
The tenant may, indeed, until recently, have found herself in an
even more precarious position. Before trial, the sheriff may have served
not only a complaint and summons but also a writ of possession ordering
the tenant to surrender possession "forthwith." The landlord secured
this relief pursuant to section 1166(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure
by establishing that the defendant was, inter alia, insolvent or that the
property subject to execution was insufficient to satisfy the amount of
damages sought to be recovered. Although this remedy was patently
unconstitutional6' and socially inadvisable,62 it has been used in num-
59. Id. § 1161(2).
60. Id. § 1167.
61. As early as 1937, the year in which this provision was originally enacted, sec-
tion 1166a was declared unconstitutional by a specially convened three judge panel of
the San Francisco Municipal Court. Dillon v. Cockell (S.F. Mun. Ct. 1937) in the S.F.
RECORDER, September 22, 1937. The unconstitutionality of section 1166a would appear
to be clear a fortiori under the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Mendoza v.
Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 21 P.2d 9 (1958), and the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In
Mendoza the court held unconstitutional an amendment to CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.
§ 117 which permitted unlawful detainer cases to be heard in small claims court. Since
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erous areas. The tenant continues to face the same danger, albeit after
a hearing limited solely to the presence of the factors indicated.
Suppose our tenant succeeds in securing legal counsel before a
default has been entered and the attorney is in a position to file a
responsive pleading within the time allowed. She still must face many
pitfalls inherent in the unlawful detainer procedure. A questionable
judicial interpretation probably forecloses the tenant from filing a coun-
no stay of the eviction was provided as a matter of right, and since the tenant could not
have counsel in the small claims court, the court concluded that the tenant was in
effect denied a hearing and hence deprived of his property (i.e., possession of the
premises) without due process of law. The Sniadach case struck down prejudgment
wage garnishments as a deprivation of property without due process, since the garnish-
ments issued without any opportunity for notice and hearing. Section 1166a provides for
no hearing, let alone a hearing without counsel as in Mendoza; certainly the loss of
possession of the rented premises is of at least equal magnitude with the temporary
loss of possession of the $31.59 wages in Sniadach. The Municipal Court of the City
and County of San Francisco has recently reiterated the unconstitutionality of section
1166a. Auburn v. Jones, No. 623689 (S.F. Mun. Ct., July 7, 1969) (order quashing
writ.)
Since this article was written, section 1166a was amended to provide for notice and
a hearing. The hearing, however, is limited to a determination of whether "the de-
fendant is insolvent, or has no property that is subject to execution sufficient to satisfy
the amount of damages sought to be recovered by the plaintiff, or resides out of the
State, or has departed from the State, or cannot, after due diligence be found within
the State, or conceals himself to avoid the service of summons." Cal. Stats. 1969, ch.
903, § 1, at 492 (Deering's Adv. Leg. Serv. No. 5, 1969). To the extent the tenant
stands to lose possession after a hearing limited solely to these issues, there appears to
be the same due process objection. Further, since the right to have a full hearing
will depend on the wealth or economic status of the tenant, the section appears, addi-
tionally, to violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
62. The undesirability and hardship of simply putting families on the street is
obvious enough. The social implications, however, may go beyond the great hardships
to the individual family. The first direct experience the author had with this provision
involved a black family consisting of a mother, her eight children, and her elderly
mother. They were living in the Western Addition section of San Francisco, a black
ghetto in the throes of redevelopment where racial tensions have on occasion reached a
high level. My client had been living in a rundown apartment, which the owners, who
are white, had refused to repair. The owners are well-known as the landlords of
numerous similar buildings in the area and, additionally, are well-known as money
lenders, generally at extremely high interest rates. The client, in the face of the owner's
refusal to make repairs, stopped paying rent. The landlords served a writ of immediate
possession before trial. The writ was served on the morning after the assassination
of Dr. Martin Luther King when feelings in all black communities had reached a fever
pitch. Only by the greatest good fortune was a potentially explosive incident avoided.
When the other attorney was advised of the facts of the matter he withheld execution.
The Redevelopment Agency, sensitive to the implications of the situation, fortunately
was able to relocate the family to one of its units that was in the process of being
rehabilitated, but that was sufficiently complete as to be habitable. Without the
cooperation of opposing counsel and the assistance of the Redevelopment Agency, a
disastrous confrontation might have been triggered.
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terclaim. 3 Although the statute appears to permit the filing of a counter-
claim, 61 as opposed to a cross-complaint, the repeated lumping to-
gether of the two in judicial pronouncements 5 would appear to negate
chances of success. This prohibits the tenant from setting off as dam-
ages the injuries attributable to the landlord's violations of the law,"6
even though the economic loss resulting from these injuries has pre-
vented her from paying rent."
The speed in setting unlawful detainer cases for trial presents an
additional hurdle. Usually, the day after the answer is filed a request
for setting is received in the mail. Shortly thereafter (sometimes on the
same day), a clerk's notice is received setting the trial a few days later.,
Although a defendant in an unlawful detainer action clearly has the
right to utilize available discovery procedures, 9 to subpoena witnesses,
and generally to prepare for trial, judicial attitudes in the scheduling
of these proceedings significantly impair these rights. The preparation
of defenses based on code violations may require the acquisition
of expert witnesses and the subpoena of building inspectors. More-
over, a retaliatory eviction case may require extensive investigation to
prove the motivation of the landlord. Where the dispute is simply the
63. See Knowles v. Robinson, 60 Cal. 2d 620, 387 P.2d 833, 36 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963).
64. CAL. CODE CIrv. PROC. § 1170 permits the defendant to "answer or demur."
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1177 makes applicable to unlawful detainer proceedings the pro-
visions of part two of the Code of Civil Procedure "except as otherwise provided in this
chapter." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 437 provides that the answer of defendant shall con-
tain, inter alia, "[a] statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim"
(emphasis added). Since a counterclaim is part of the answer and since the chapter con-
taining the unlawful detainer procedure does not forbid the answer containing a counter-
claim, it would seem that the statute in fact permits filing of a counterclaim.
65. Knowles v. Robinson, 60 Cal. 2d 620, 387 P.2d 833, 36 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963);
Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915).
66. Such as her loss of income and medical bills.
67. It is even possible that a court might later conclude that the tenant's claim
arose out of the same transaction as the unlawful detainer proceeding and is foreclosed
by CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 439. This provides: "If the defendant omits to set up a
counterclaim upon a cause arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim, neither he nor his assignee can afterwards maintain
an action against the plaintiff therefor."
68. From the author's experience, this appears to be the standard practice in
San Francisco Municipal Court.
69. This right to discovery is evident only through analysis of the relevant code
section and judicial decisions. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2030 simply gives either "party"
a right to discovery. Section 2016 provides that depositions, for purposes of discovery,
may be taken in any action or special proceeding. An unlawful detainer proceeding is
a "special proceeding." Turem v. Texaco Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 758, 46 Cal. Rptr.
389 (1969). Thus it follows that a party in an unlawful detainer proceeding is entitled
to discovery.
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amount of rent owed, the tenant is certainly entitled to ascertain through
discovery procedures the factual contentions of the landlord and to pre-
pare his case for trial. Although the monetary amount involved may
seem small, it can be large in relation to the income of a low-income
defendant. This is especially true if the tenant loses at trial because
there is a danger that she will be liable for treble damages.
70
Shortly after judgment is entered, the sheriff will serve the tenant
with a notice to vacate, together with a writ of restitution.7'1  If the
tenant has not moved wihin five days,' 2 she will be removed and her
property, without exemption, may be placed in storage and sold after 30
days.7 3  Under a recent amendment, the landlord may elect to store
the property on the premises (after having it inventoried by the sheriff)
and sell it himself after 30 days at a public sale.74  Thus, if a tenant is
unable to find new housing and get assistance in moving, she is in dan-
ger of losing all her property.
It must again be stressed that beyond the question of damages and
the liability for rent, the critical concern of tenants in most cases is
possession. In the face of the severe housing shortage, continued
possession of the rental premises is often of paramount importance to
the tenant; consequently, a judgment granting the landlord possession
entails great potential hardship for the tenant.
2. The Emerging Defenses
Having considered the difficulties presented by the unlawful de-
tainer procedure and its application by the courts, let us now turn to a
consideration of the defenses available to a tenant who withholds rent.75
70. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1174 provides for treble damages. In the author's ex-
perience treble damages are infrequently, if ever, awarded in cases involving residential
property. In view of the limitations of available low-income housing and other practi-
cal problems of the low-income tenant, it would seem infrequent that a court would
be justified in finding the requisite wilfulness justifying treble damages. Yet the danger
of an unsympathetic court so finding does exist.
71. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174.
72. Prior to an amendment in 1968 to section 1174, the tenant was not entitled
to any time to vacate after service of the writ. See Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1600, § 2,
at 3830-31.
73. CAL. CODE Ctv. PROC. § 1174.
74. Id.
75. Although available defenses in unlawful detainer proceedings have historically
been drastically limited, much of this limitation might be attributed to a historical fail-
ure to deal with the contractual aspects of the rental of property insofar as they affect
the right to possession. Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915); D'Am-
ico v. Ridel, 95 Cal. App. 2d 6, 212 P.2d 52 (1949). Numerous cases, however, have
relied on the equitable nature of the unlawful detainer proceeding to permit defenses
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Since these defenses have been generally treated elsewhere,7 this discus-
sion will be limited to their application in California.
Historically, the rental of premises was viewed as a conveyance of
an interest in land rather than as a contract.7  In addition, the doctrine
of caveat emptor was applied to such a conveyance.7 8  Consequently,
a tenant confronted by defects in the premises had no right to refuse to
pay rent since his landlord was under no duty to repair.79  Even where
a lease contained the landlord's express covenant to repair, the courts
generally treated that covenant as independent of the duty to pay rent.80
Thus, a substantial breach of the covenant to repair by the landlord
did not relieve the tenant of his duty to pay rent.
Just as the legislature has modified the common law rule denying
any duty on the part of the landlord to repair and maintain his prem-
ises,"' the courts have slowly undermined the traditional view of the
lease as a conveyance. The modern tendency is to regard a lease as a
contract as well as a conveyance.8 2 Consequently, the rights and duties
of the parties are construed in accordance with the rules pertaining to
the construction of contracts.8 3 Furthermore, the thrust of the case law
based on equitable considerations to an action for possession. Schubert v. Lowe, 193
Cal. 291, 223 P. 550 (1924); Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242,
22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962); Strom v. Union Oil Co., 88 Cal. App. 2d 78, 198 P.2d 347
(1948); Rishwain v. Smith, 77 Cal. App. 2d 524, 175 P.2d 555 (1947). From the
standpoint of unlawful detainer procedure, the defenses discussed here should be
permissible either as equitable considerations or as directly affecting the lessor's en-
titlement to the rent claimed. In Giraud v. Milovich, 29 Cal. App. 2d 543, 85 P.2d
182 (1939), the court permitted a tenant in possession to raise the defense of partial
eviction (discussed infra), concluded that the landlord was entitled to no rent since he
was not permitted to apportion his wrong, and denied the landlord's action for posses-
sion. Of course, substantively, the availability of these defenses may depend on the
court's increasing willingness to apply contractual principles to the rental of property.
76. See, e.g., F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUsING CODE VIOLATION (National
Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 14, 1968); Gribetz & Grad, Housing
Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1254 (1966); Scho-
shinksi, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.. 519 (1966).
Note, Leases and the Illegal Contract Theory-Judicial Reinforcement of the Housing
Code, 56 GEo. L.J. 920 (1968).
77. 1 AMERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
78. Id.
79. Brewster v. Defremery, 33 Cal. 341 (1867).
80. E.g., Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915); Note, The
California Lease--Contact or Conveyance?, 4 STAN. L. REV. 244 (1952).
81. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
82. Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract (Damages for
Anticipatory Breach And Interdependency of Covenants), 16 TEXAs L. REv. 47 (1938);
Note, supra note 80.
83. See Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 547 (1942);
Wright v. Coberly West Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 31, 58 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1967). See
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has been to create an interdependence between the duty to pay rent and
the duty to repair.
This interdependence first arose with the judicial doctrine of con-
structive eviction. The theoretical underpinning for constructive evic-
tion is the covenant of quiet enjoyment,84 which is implied by law
in the rental of all property.
85
Two elements have traditionally been required for the operation of
the doctrine of constructive eviction. First, the tenant must demon-
strate that the lessor has either substantially interfered with the tenant's
beneficial enjoyment of the premises or made them unfit for the pur-
poses for which they were leased. 86  It is sufficient if the interference
arises from the landlord's failure to take some action required by law,
such as the making of necessary repairs. 87  Second, the tenant must
abandon the premises within a reasonable period of time. The re-
quirement of abandonment appears to be based on the theory that by
maintaining possession the tenant waives the landlord's breach.89 This
requirement, of course, presents a potentially insuperable barrier for
our hypothetical tenant. Although she may be able to show that the
landlord's violation of the housing laws substantially interferes with her
enjoyment of the premises, she may be unable to move because of the
existing housing shortage. In view of the lack of suitable alternatives,
it would appear reasonable to conclude that the indigent tenant does
not "waive" the landlord's breach." The courts, then, should recog-
nize some remedy whereby the tenant can assert a right accruing under
generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 B. WITXIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Real Property § 230 (7th ed. 1960).
84. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.47 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). The scope of
this covenant has ordinarily been held to include both an assurance against a defec-
tive title, and a guarantee that the lessee shall enjoy the premises, uninterrupted by the
acts of the landlord. Id. § 3.49.
85. Several states including California have codified this covenant. See CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1927; LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2692 (West 1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21,
§ 91 (1957).
86. Slater v. Conti, 171 Cal. App. 2d 582, 341 P.2d 395 (1959); Pierce v. Nash,
126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 272 P.2d 938 (1954); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.51
at 282 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
87. Friedman v. Isenbruck, 111 Cal. App. 2d 326, 244 P.2d 718 (1952); Butt v.
Bertola, 110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952); Johnson v. Snyder, 99 Cal. App.
2d 86, 221 P.2d 164 (1950).
88. Pierce v. Nash, 126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 272 P.2d 938 (1954); Lori Ltd. v.
Wolfe, 85 Cal. App. 2d 54, 192 P.2d 112 (1948); Bakersfield Laundry Ass'n v. Rubin,
131 Cal. App. 2d 862, 280 P.2d 921 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1955).
89. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 16 R.C.L.
§ 172 (1917).
90. See Schoshinski, supra note 76, at 530-31.
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a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment without having to comply
with the removal element of constructive eviction.91
In some situations, a tenant may be able to rely on the related
theory of partial eviction, which has no requirement of abandonment.
92
In a California case,93 the lessor of a piece of property conveyed a
portion of the leased parcel of land to the state. The court found a
partial eviction and held that the tenant was excused from paying
rent since the rent obligation could not be apportioned.94 Similarly, if
the tenant was unable to use a portion of the rented apartment because
of disrepair, then arguably he would have no obligation during the
period of this "partial eviction."
The second major defense that has evolved for our hypothetical
tenant is the strictly contractual one of implied warranty of habitability.
This implied warranty, analogous to those applicable to the sale of goods,
is based on the duties placed on the landlord by the state and municipal
housing ordinances. 95 Development of this warranty theory has been
stimulated by a judicial recognition that application of the rule of
caveat emptor does not realistically give the tenant a meaningful choice.
The warranty of habitability was first implied in connection with
furnished rooms. It was felt that in such a situation the parties normally
intend an immediate occupancy without an opportunity for the tenant
to inspect the premises or make them tenantable.96 This reasoning
would seem equally applicable to the usual situation involving low-in-
come tenants.9 7  The opportunity for any meaningful inspection or
choice by the tenant is virtually nonexistent. He is usually in desperate
need of housing. The choices are generally limited to apartments which
are not in conformity with housing and health code requirements;
moreover, many of the defects (such as vermin, faulty wiring, de-
91. See Note, Partial Constructive Eviction: The Common Law Answer in the
Tenant's Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS L.I. 417 (1970). Two cases have
regarded the housing shortage as instrumental in the failure of the tenant to remove,
and have allowed for a reduction (but not a total suspension) of the rent where the
landlord brought an action for rent and the tenants could not assert constructive eviction
because they had not vacated. Johnson v. Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153
(N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1950), and Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y.
Mun. Ct. 1946).
92 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.52 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
93. Giraud v. Milovich, 29 Cal. App. 2d 543, 85 P.2d 182 (1939).
94. Id. at 548, 85 P.2d at 185.
95. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Comment,
Housing-Warranty of Habitability Gives Efficacy to Housing Code Enforcement. 13
N.Y.L.F. 383 (1967).
96. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A.J Casner ed. 1952).
97. Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CoNN. L. REv. 61, 74 (1969).
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fective heating) are not apparent to the tenant on a cursory examina-
tion.98
The doctrine of implied warranty of habitability has been endorsed
in a recent California case. In Buckner v. Azulai,99 a tenant sued for
damages caused by infestation of the unfurnished apartment by vermin.
In granting judgment for the tenant, the trial court awarded as damages
the return of the deposit for the last month's rent. The appellate de-
partment of the superior court affirmed the decision rejecting the com-
mon law rule of no implied warranty of habitability. 10 The Wiscon-
sin case of Pines v. Perssion'1 was quoted with approval:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in
leases [of accommodations for housing] would in our opinion, be
inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing
standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing
for people in this era of rapid population increases is too important
to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor.10 2
Although the Buckner case has endorsed an implied warranty of
habitability, numerous uncertainties remain for the tenant who withholds
rent. Will a local municipal court follow the rule enunciated by an
appellate department of the superior court when previous higher appel-
late court decisions'' have rejected any duty of the landlord? Will it
analyze the significance of the housing legislation? If the court does
find a breach of implied warranty, what relief will be given? If the
relief is an adjustment in the rental figure, what is the measure of dam-
ages? One commentator' suggests that the measure be the difference
between the agreed rental and the actual value of the premises with the
code violations. A court might conclude, however, that in light of the
housing shortage, the agreed rent was the "reasonable" value of the prem-
ises even with the defects. Another author has suggested as an appro-
priate measure the difference in the value of the rented premises in
their nonconforming condition and their value if they met the standard
implicit in the warranty.'0 5 Acceptance of this measure would osten-
98. Any theory of "waiver" of defects by the tenant should be rejected for much
the same reasons. See Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806
(Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1967); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal
for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966); Comment, supra note 95.
99. 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1967).
100. Id. at 1015, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
101. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1947).
102. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 1015, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 808, quoting Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1947).
103. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
104. Schoshinski, supra note 98, at 527.
105. Comment, supra note 95, at 388.
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sibly defeat an initial unlawful detainer proceeding because the amount
demanded by the landlord in his three day notice would exceed the
amount to which he was entitled." 6 But what if the landlord then gave a
30 day notice? Would the court, using an analysis similar to that sug-
gested in connection with retaliatory evictions, consider this to be con-
trary to public policy?
1 7
Another theory that the tenant might utilize in a rent withholding
situation is that of illegal contracts. A landlord who rents premises
he knows to be in violation of housing regulations is entering into an
agreement contrary either to an express statutory enactment or at least
to the policy behind these statutes.10 ' In Shephard v. Lerner,09 the
parties entered into a commercial lease of property used for hotel apart-
ment purposes. During the term of the lease, the City and County of
San Francisco ordered several rooms closed and filed a condemnation
proceeding based on violations of municipal codes and the State Housing
Law. The tenant then filed an action for declaratory relief to ascertain
the status of the lease; the lessor counterclaimed for the balance of the
rent and damages. The trial court found that both parties knew the
premises were being used in violation of local ordinances and state regu-
latory statutes. It held that the contract was for an illegal purpose, and
since the parties were in pari delicto, no enforcible rights or obligations
arose.' 10 In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeal
stated:
In these cases, 1' the underlying transactions involved a violation
of law and the courts considered them to be against public policy.
The rule does not rest upon consideration of justice between the
parties but on the principle that public policy requires that certain
transactions be discouraged. The same policy considerations apply
with equal force to contracts that involve a violation of valid regu-
lations designed to promote public health and safety.
1 2
The appellate court denied the lessor any recovery either under
the lease or on the basis of unjust enrichment.
106. See Werner v. Sargeant, 121 Cal. App. 2d 833, 264 P.2d 217 (1953).
107. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
108. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1667 is a rather broad provision classifying unlawful con-
tracts into three classes: First, those contracts contrary to an express provision of law;
second, those contracts contrary to the policy of express law; and finally, those
otherwise contrary to good morals. It would appear that many leases could be invali-
dated on any of the above provisions. Another approach has been to view the lease as
a contract of adhesion where circumstances prevent equality of bargaining. I U.S.F.L.
REV. 306, 317 (1967).
109. 182 Cal. App. 2d 746, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960).
110. Id. at 749, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
111. Referring to cases involving licensing statutes.
112. 182 Cal. App. 2d at 750-51, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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The theory of Shephard v. Lerner is even more applicable to the
residential tenant who is clearly within the class for whose benefit the
legislation was enacted.11 Since the underlying agreement would be
void, the landlord should not be entitled to rent.1
4
If the court voids the rental agreement, does the tenant have any
right to possession? The landlord will probably resort immediately to
the use of a 30 day notice in an attempt to relet the premises to a more
compliant tenant. The court must choose between allowing the tenant
to maintain possession rent free" 5 or allowing the landlord to circum-
vent the purpose behind the housing legislation. Here also, the tenant
must put his possession in jeopardy to determine what choice the court
will make.
In fact, any tenant who seeks to compel a landlord to comply with
housing code requirements by witholding rent clearly does so at his peril.
Each of the defenses discussed has major uncertainties which create a
risk that the tenant who withholds rent will lose possession.' This is
a risk most low-income tenants can ill afford. Although individual rent
withholding" 7 may compel a landlord to make minor repairs rather
than go to the expense of an eviction, it does not appear, at present, to
be an effective means of securing landlord compliance.
113. Note that the theory is applicable because when a person is a member of a
class protected by a statute he is usually not regarded as in pari delicto with the person
whom the statute is designed to protect him against. 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORIA LAW Contracts § 160, at 172 (7th ed. 1960). Thus the rule in the
Shephard case would operate only against the landlord.
114. The leading case is Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App.
1968), where a lease transferring premises in violation of the housing regulations con-
ferred no rights on the landlord to extract rent. But see Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. App. 1968), which would not extend the doctrine of Brown
v. Southall to situations where the defects did not exist at the time of the rental.
115. The courts have permitted this in the partial eviction situation in view of
the landlord's wrongdoing. Giraud v. Milovich, 29 Cal. App. 2d 543, 85 P.2d 182
(1939).
116. Defenses in addition to those discussed may be constructed on the equitable
nature of the unlawful detainer proceeding, see cases cited note 75 supra, such as
unclean hands, relying on the illegality of the landlord's performance of fraud, or simply
a straight reliance on fraudulent representations of the landlord. These defenses obvi-
ously suffer from uncertainties similar to those discussed.
117. Although collective rent withholding-where a number of a landlord's ten-
ants withhold rent-may occasionally be effective because of the increased economic
impact on the landlord, organization of low-income tenants is difficult and the same
dangers remain where a landlord chooses to institute an unlawful detainer action.
Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 304 (1965).
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1I. The Need for a Change
We have now surveyed the position of the low-income tenant;
clearly, the law of landlord-tenant is in need of a major overhaul. Exist-
ing law has demonstrated its ineffectiveness. Housing codes are largely
unenforced. As a result, a substantial percentage of low-income fam-
ilies are c6mpelled to live in housing that is inadequate, unsafe and un-
sanitary. The enormity of their plight is more sharply brought into
focus if one considers the far-reaching social and psychological conse-
quences that these people are forced to suffer. If the situation is to be
alleviated, new devices are necessary to make code enforcement more
effective and more responsive to the needs of the tenant.
There is an even stronger, although related, reason for change,
beyond that of simply making housing regulations more effective. As
the demands on our urban housing resources have increased, they have
created a dangerous dichotomy between the theoretical legal obligations
of the landlord and the current realities. The unrest in our urban
society today indicates the potential for undesirable social consequen-
ces if this gap is not eliminated.
We live in times of increasing polarization of the society at large"18
-white against nonwhite, "haves" against "have-nots" (and to a large
degree the poor are also nonwhite), young against old. Characteristic
of this polarization is an increasing distrust in the established societal
institutions, particularly in the legal system. Feelings of hostility, engen-
dered by a life of deprivation in a society of general affluence, are re-
inforced by the apparent discriminatory applications of the law and by a
sense of impotence and impossibility of bringing about change through
traditional means.119
Our hypothetical tenant lives in an apartment that is obviously in
violation of housing regulations. Her landlord is responsible for these
violations, yet she is virtually powerless to compel him to make the
needed corrections. Attempts by the tenant to compel performance by
the landlord usually culminate in a court ordering immediate eviction.
It is not surprising that our tenant would react to her impotence with
hostility when she discovers not only that she is denied relief but also
that the landlord's illegal agreement is enforced by the courts.
In conclusion, changes are needed to accomplish the following:
First, to secure greater realization of the aims of housing regulations by
118. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVL DISORDERS
(1967); M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).
119. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CrivI DISORDERS (1967);
Y. CLARK, DARK GHETtO (1965).
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providing effective means for tenant enforcement; second, to elimi-
nate the unfairness found in much of the existing landlord-tenant law;
third, to eliminate the undesirable and dangerous situation in which the
courts not only refuse relief to a tenant seeking to enforce the law, but
also penalize the tenant for his efforts.
IV. Proposed Areas for Change
In light of the preceding discussion, specific changes are needed in
certain areas. Several of the changes proposed below could be achieved
through judicial action if there were a reversal of what the author be-
lieves to be the prevailing judicial attitude in the lower trial courts.
Legislative action, however, will more reliably supply the needed im-
provements.
A. Modifying the Unlawful Detainer Procedure
1. Repeal Section 1166(a)
This provision, which permits a writ of possession before trial
without an adequate hearing, is manifestly unconstitutional, 120 grossly
unfair, and socially dangerous.12 ' A low-income tenant should not be
deprived of the right to possession before receiving a meaningful day in
court.
2. Extend the Time to Answer
The three day period now provided 22 is unrealistically short, partic-
ularly since it includes nonbusiness days. The effect of this provision is
to deprive numerous people of the opportunity to contest the eviction.
3. Provide Adequate Time to Prepare for Trial
This problem is obviously a matter for judicial consideration. Al-
though an unlawful detainer action is entitled to preferential setting,
123
the present practice of scheduling it for trial within just a few days of
the answer obviously permits little or no time for trial preparation and
effectively deprives the tenant of his right to discovery. In addition,
emerging defenses may involve inquiries more complex than the sim-
ple question whether or not rent has been paid.
120. See note 61 supra.
121. See note 62 supra.
122. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1167.
123. Id. § 1179a.
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4. Permit Counterclaims and Cross-Complaints Relating to the
Lessor's Performance of His Duties
The tenant in an unlawful detainer proceeding should be permitted
to counterclaim or cross-complain (if the plaintiff is different from
the owner of the premises) for damages he has sustained as a result of
the landlord's failure to perform his obligations. 124 Although this
occasionally will complicate the proceeding, there will often be a sub-
stantial overlap between the landlord's right to rent and the tenant's
right to damages. Moreover, with the important right of possession
hanging in the balance, considerations of fairness should outweigh the
potential complications.
B. Limiting the Sections Providing a Landlord's Lien and Execution
on an Unlawful Detainer Judgment
The provisions for a landlord's lien,125 and the provisions for exe-
cution on an unlawful detainer judgment,126 should provide for the same
exemptions found in the sections providing for the general execution of
judgments.127  Although section 1861(a) provides substantial exemp-
tions, a landlord should not stand in a different position from any
other creditor in terms of depriving a debtor of the necessities of life.
If it is necessary for the sheriff to remove all of the tenant's property
from the premises, the tenant should be given the opportunity to claim
that property necessary to everyday living.
2
C. Expanding and Clarifying California's "Repair and Deduct Remedy"
Numerous changes should be made in sections 1941 and 1942 
29
to improve both the tenant's right to make the premises tenantable and
the right to deduct the cost of these repairs from the rent. Section 1941
should be amended to prohibit any waiver of this right to make the
premises tenantable, thereby eliminating the present invitation to waiver.
Section 1942 should be thoroughly amended to expand and clarify
the remedy. The term "dilapidations" should be eliminated, and refer-
ence should be made to the requirements of state and local housing
regulations. In so doing, the distinction between "repairs" and "im-
124. See note 64 supra.
125. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1174.
126. Id.
127. Id. §§ 690 to 690.50.
128. The author has had clients who were without food or necessary medicine, or
who were unable to report to their jobs because of the lack of proper clothing.
129. See text accompanying notes 9-15 supra.
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provements" should be rejected as irrational in view of the purpose of
the remedy. 130
The rental period permitted for needed repairs should be length-
ened to allow more substantial improvements to be made without resort
to the alternative remedies previously suggested."' To protect the land-
lord from the possibility that the tenant may pay an excessive price, the
section could require that the tenant submit to the landlord bids for the
proposed work when the cost exceeds a specified dollar amount. This
would also provide the landlord with an opportunity of doing the work
himself. However, the lessee should be permitted to make the repairs
himself and be compensated at prevailing wage rates provided he gives
the landlord a cost estimate that does not exceed the specified amount
requiring bids. Additionally, the section should clarify the frequency
with which a tenant may use this remedy. To protect both landlord and
tenant, the code section should specify how much notice need be given
the landlord before any repairs can be made.
D. Providing New Remedies
The most striking feature of code enforcement in California is the
paucity of effective remedies. A number of states have provided addi-
tional tools to effectuate compliance with housing codes, which go be-
yond the manifestly inadequate remedy of administrative action lead-
ing to criminal penalties or condemnation proceedings." 2  California
130. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
131. The remedies of receivership or court action to compel performance.
132. For example, numerous states have authorized the institution of receiverships
for the management and repair of offending buildings. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-
347(b) (Supp. 1969); ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (1965); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 125.535 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2.12h (1967); N.Y. MULT.
DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
Some states authorize the deposit of the rent into an escrow account set up
either by the court or by the enforcement agency. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111,
§ 127f (Supp. 1969); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.530(4) (Supp. 1969); N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACTIONS & PROc. LAW § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); N.Y. MULT.
DWELL. LAW § 302a (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1
(Supp. 1969). Payment into the account is a defense to eviction proceedings. The
funds in some cases may be applied by the court or the code enforcement agency to re-
pair of the premises (e.g., Massachusetts and Michigan) or may be simply held in
escrow until repairs or assurances of repair are made with a time limit for retention of
the funds in escrow (e.g., New York and Pennsylvania).
Rhode Island has recently enacted a provision providing specifically for an im-
plied warranty of habitability and maintenance of habitability in all leases of residen-
tial property. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-16 (Special Supp. 1968). Massachusetts
provides for rent abatement or rent withholding where premises are in violation of
standards of fitness for human habitation established by health codes if the violation
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law should be changed to provide at least the following:
1. Explicit Warranties of Habitability
The holding of Buckner v. Azulai133 should be codified to elimi-
nate any doubt that inherent in any rental agreement for residential
purposes is an implied warranty that the premises are fit for habitation
and will be kept in compliance with applicable state and local housing
and health requirements. 34 It should be made explicit that the land-
lord's right to rent payments under any rental agreement is dependent3 5
upon this implied covenant. Finally, substantial breach by the land-
lord should be a defense in an unlawful detainer proceeding seeking
possession for nonpayment of rent.
2. More Extensive Enforcement Remedies
The obvious aim of housing and health codes is to bring non-
conforming structures into compliance and to prevent owners from
permitting their buildings to fall into disrepair. Although protected rent
withholding may bring about these objectives, it does not insure that the
withheld money will be spent on rehabilitating the rented premises. A
low-income tenant may often spend his rent money for things other than
repair. Consequently, a means should be provided to assure not only
that whenever economically feasible rehabilitation and maintenance of
residential housing will be brought about, but also that the income from
the property will be applied to this purpose. To achieve this objective,
new remedies are needed. A broad range of weapons providing for
specific performance, escrow accounts, and receiverships should be
provided.130 Michigan has recently amended its housing code legislation
may endanger or materially impair the health or safety of the tenants. MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § SA (Supp. 1968).
In cases regarding welfare tenants, New York, by virtue of the controversial "Spie-
gel Law," N.Y. Soc. WELF. LAW § 143-b (McKinney Supp. 1969-70), and Illinois by a
similar statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969), authorize
rent withholding by the welfare officials and guarantee a defense against eviction
based on the nonpayment of rent.
In addition to or in conjunction with the remedies mentioned, a number of these
states give either tenants or the code enforcing agency the right to file suit to compel
the owner to repair the premises. E.g., MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 125.53b (Supp.
1969); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 127H (Supp. 1969).
133. 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1967).
134. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-16 (Special Supp. 1968).
135. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
136. For reference to laws in other states providing these remedies, see authorities
cited note 132 supra.
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to seek this result. 13 7  Under this legislation, if the premises do not
comply with the regulations, the obligation to pay rent ceases 138 and
the suspended rental must be paid into an escrow account administered
by the local code enforcing agency.' 3 9 The money in this account is to
be used to pay for repairs with any balance going to the landlord. 40
Either the enforcing agency or the occupant may file suit to com-
pel compliance with the housing act.14" The court has general jurisdic-
tion to enforce the act; its powers include enjoining violations, ordering
the owner to repair, authorizing agency action, imposing a lien on the
property for the cost of repairs, and establishing, within limits, the
lien's priority. 4 2 Furthermore, the court is specifically authorized to
appoint a receiver of the premises with broad powers to manage the
property and apply the proceeds toward repairs.1
43
While the author questions some of the specific aspects of the
Michigan legislation, particularly the dependence of the tenant on ad-
ministrative action 144 and the limitations of the repair lien,' 45 it basically
provides a desirable framework for change.
The provision of an escrow account protects against "leakage" of
the rent and gives assurance that it will go toward repairs. 4 In addi-
tion, it guards against the situation where the tenant is using the viola-
tions of the housing act simply as a means of avoiding the payment of
rent.
The availability of a receivership having broad powers of man-
agement and repair provides a potentially effective means of assuring
rehabilitation and maintenance of the property. Numerous aspects of the
receivership remedy deserve analysis. Substantial areas of inquiry cen-
ter around who may institute the proceeding, what substantive stand-
ard justifies invoking this remedy, who will be the receiver, and what
means may be used to generate funds for rehabilitation."' Since the
137. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.521-.537 (Supp. 1969).
138. Id. § 125.530(3).
139. Id. § 125.530(4).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 125.536.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 125.535.
144. Where the tenant has filed suit the enforcing agency may be substituted for
the tenant in the discretion of the court. Id.
145. The lien will be subordinate to a mortgage which was recorded at a date
when a certificate of compliance issued by the code enforcing agency was in effect.
Id. § 125.534(7).
146. Id. § 125.530.
147. See Pratt, Receiverships in the Rehabilitation of Urban Housing, 2 HARv. CIv.
RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 219 (1967).
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purpose of this article is not to set out in detail the proposed changes
with an exhaustive analysis of their ramifications, but rather to point
out general areas for reform, these questions will not be pursued. How-
ever, any remedy provided should assure substantial control and partici-
pation by the tenant. The tenant should not be dependent on action
by an already overburdened and understaffed agency. He should have
an effective say in the priority of repairs.
3. Damages for Breach of the Landlord's Obligations
Existing law should be clarified to provide explicitly for recovery
by the tenant for personal injury or property damages arising from the
failure of the landlord to comply with his obligations under the state or
local housing codes.
E. Prohibition of Retaliation
From the viewpoint of tenant attitudes, the law ideally should re-
quire a showing of "just cause" as a condition for eviction. Landlords
in the present housing market have substantial economic power and are
extensively regulated by statute. Consequently, they are analogous to
public utilities or businesses endowed with a public interest.
148
A specific provision should be made prohibiting, at a minimum,
retaliatory eviction or rent increases.'49 This protection should include
within its ambit tenant activity ranging from a request to the landlord
for repairs to contacting the enforcement agencies. 5 ' To avoid factual
problems and questions of intent, an eviction or rent increase within a
given time period-e.g., within six months following the exercise by the
tenant of any protected activity-should be prima facie retaliatory. This
would require the landlord to show affirmatively that his action was not
for purposes of retaliation.' 5
V. Change in Judicial Attitudes
It may be peculiar in an article of this nature to say simply that it
is necessary to have a change in judicial attitudes; yet this is the primary
148. See generally Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service
Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1247, 1268 (1967).
149. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-92.1
(Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (Special Supp. 1968).
150. Rhode Island in fact would seem to verge on a requirement of just cause
by prohibiting retaliation for any "lawful act" of the tenant. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 34-20-10 (Special Supp. 1968).
151. Thus New Jersey creates a presumption of retaliation where notice to quit or
of substantial alterations of the terms of the tenancy is served within 90 days of the
tenant's complaint. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-92.1 (Supp. 1969).
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reason for the ineffectiveness of existing law and the disillusioned feelings
of tenants. Too often in the author's experience, and that of other
attorneys representing indigent tenants, the judge simply assumes that
any tenant not paying rent is a "deadbeat" not entitled to any con-
sideration from the court. Too often the court simply repeats those
repugnant shibboleths: "A landlord can terminate a tenancy for any
reason he wishes" and "if you don't like it there, you can always move."
The time has certainly come for reappraisal of ancient dogma
and attitudes in light of statutory and social changes. Adequate re-
sponse of the law to the needs of society depends on the willingness of
judges to reevaluate old answers to new problems and to be receptive to
social realities. Only through judicial willingness to reexamine estab-
lished rhetoric in light of harsh realities, and judicial amenability to
necessary improvements, can really significant changes occur.
